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Various social networks share prominent features: clustering, right-
skewed degree distribution, segregation into densely connected com-
munities. We build network formation game rationalizing these fea-
tures with signal-extraction benet by network participants. The
players build network to exchange their private signals on the relevant
state. We show that a family of Nash equilibrium networks possesses
the above-mentioned prominent features of real networks. We show,
furthermore, that networks with these features are e¢ cient.
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Social networks contribute to di¤usion of information and inuence human
behavior (Durlauf, 2004; Goyal 2007; Jackson, 2010; Topa and Zenou, 2015).
Examples include the adoption of new product or technology, vote, school
performance, delinquent behavior and health-related behaviors (smoking, de-
gree of obesity). Various social networks share prominent features (Jackson,
2010; Goyal 2007) including: (i) clustering, that is, a high proportion of
individuals with a common connection connected to each other; (ii) core-
periphery structure with a small number of hubs, having many connections
(and relatively low clustering coe¢ cient) and the other individuals having
considerably fewer connections; (iii) segregation into densely connected com-
munities or cliques with only few bridgesbetween di¤erent communities.
Why such networks are formed? Are they e¢ cient in some sense? We
build network formation game addressing these questions.
In our game the players build a network in order to exchange private
signals on the relevant state of Nature through its links and minimize their
uncertainty about the state. Initially, they hold di¤erentiated imperfectly
correlated priors about the state. In the rst stage they unilaterally build
network links. In the second stage, they receive private signals on the state
and communicate through its links in two successive periods.1 In the rst
period, a player truthfully announces to his network neighbors his estimator
of the state conditional on his signal. In the second period, he rationally
1A nite number of communication periods reects the playersimpatience. For sim-
plicity, there are two periods. This comports nicely with Mobius, Phan and Szeidl (2015)
who nd that information travels no further than two steps in the conversation network.
Our positive insights may hold qualitatively with a longer communication protocol.
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updates his beliefs upon messages received from network neighbours and
truthfully announce his revised estimators of the state. A players loss is
measured by his remaining uncertainty about the state, that is, the posterior
variance of the state given his private signal and two successive messages
received from the network neighbours.
In order to handle Bayesian learning on networks, we make two simplify-
ing assumptions. First, we assume that the correlation of playerspriors is
arbitrarily small. Second, we assume, that the players have imperfect knowl-
edge of network: they assume that there are no common friendships outside
their neighborhood.
We show that a family of Nash equilibrium networks (called owers)
features the above-mentioned prominent features of real networks. Further-
more, we nd that networks from this family are e¢ cient in Rawlsian sense.2
Our numerical ndings suggest that our results are robust without the sim-
plifying assumptions and they extend to utilitarian e¢ ciency criterion.
Literature review. Our work contributes to the literature on strategic
network formation (see surveys in Bloch and Dutta 2010, Goyal 2007, Jackson
2004, 2010), more specically, to the literature on strategic formation of
communication networks.3 We follow non-cooperative approach by Bala and
Goyal (2000), outlining in Section 8 how our insights may be extended to
the setting where the agents can make transfers and bargain over links, as in
2Rawlsian e¢ ciency criterion is chosen for tractability. It may be relevant because any
player can nd himself in the role of the least happy one. Our numerical ndings suggest
that our insights hold with utilitarian criterion (normalized by a components size).
3Our work is therefore complementary to models in which agents build links and strate-
gically interact through them.
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Bloch and Jackson (2007).4
In Bala and Goyal (2000), a player can link to any other player at a given
cost. In the two way ow version, which we follow, the resulting network is
undirected. A player receives a given (information) benet from the direct-
and the indirect connections. Bala and Goyal (2000) show, among other
results,5 that in the case where direct- and indirect connections are equally
valuable (no frictions), the unique strict Nash equilibrium is either staror
empty network. They show, furthermore, that a dynamic process of network
formation leads to these networks and they are e¢ cient for a certain range of
values. These insights continue to hold if the frictions are su¢ ciently small
under linear payo¤ and exponential decay.6
We build on Bala and Goyal (2000) by modeling information benet from
connections. Our owershave the central hub, as their stars. However,
segregation and clustering by peripheral players is specic to our model.
Endogeneity of information benet di¤erentiates us from a sizable litera-
ture on strategic formation of communication networks which directly relates
payo¤s to network architecture and relates us to the following two papers.
The rst paper, closely related to our work, is Hojman and Szeidl (2008).
They consider network formation game à la Bala and Goyal (2000), focusing
on benets which exhibit decreasing returns to scale and decay with network
4Hence, our insights apply to environments where investments by a pair of players in
the link connecting them may be unequal. For example, a person with disproportionately
many friends may invest in the relationship with each friend less than that friend.
5Bala and Goyal (2000) study both directed networks (one-ow version) and undirected
networks (two ow version). They provide characterization results in absence of frictions
and partial results when frictions are su¢ ciently small.
6Without frictions the star is center-sponsored. With small frictions, the star is
periphery-sponsored.
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distance. They provide one microfoundation behind such a benet: signal
transmission with exogenous frictions. They nd that the unique Nash equi-
librium is center-sponsored star, and show that this result is preserved
(under certain condition) if links are formed through bargaining with trans-
ferts.
We di¤erentiate from Hojman and Szeidl (2008) by modeling information
transmission with frictions. In our model, frictions are due to a players uncer-
tainly about the other playerspriors. Clustering helps the players to learn
each others priors and eliminate frictions. This gives a value to closed
neighbours which is not present in the payo¤ considered by Hojman and
Szeidl (2008).
The second paper, rather complementary to us, is Acemoglu, Bimpikis
and Ozdaglar (2014). They model communication on endogenous network
focusing on asymptotic learning rather than on network architecture. Their
players are divided in disjoint cliques with null cost of linking within a clique
and a positive cost of bridging di¤erent cliques (akin to cost-asymmetries in
Jackson and Rogers, 2005). They build oriented links, like in the one-ow
version of Bala and Goyal (2000). Then, they receive private signals on the
underlying state and transmit these signals through links without frictions.7
A players goal is to align his action to the state. He keeps transmitting signals
until he has su¢ ciently precise information for his action. If most agents are
su¢ ciently close to information hubtransmitting many signals, then the
fraction of agents taking correct action approaches one when the number of
7The paper also considers an alternative communication protocol under which the play-
ers transmit posterior expectation rather than taggedsignals. Furthermore, it allows for
strategic communication and shows that truthful communication is an equilibrium when
it leads to asymptotic learning.
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players gets innite (asymptotic learning). Equilibrium networks may or may
not lead to asymptotic learning, depending on: the playerspatience; size of
cliques (formed due to cost asymmetries); and the cost of bridging di¤erent
cliques. Notably, large social cliques impede asymptotic learning because it
is not worthwhile for at least some members of one clique to communicate
with members of other cliques.
Our focus is di¤erent: We are interested in the architecture- and e¢ -
ciency of networks formed in equilibrium rather than in asymptotic learning.
We take a di¤erent approach to network formation, assuming away any cost
asymmetries. Yet, we nd cliques or clusters in our equilibrium networks. The
reason is that our information structure is such that information is transmit-
ted with frictions unless the sender and the receiver belong to the same
cluster.
Two other papers are related to our work. First, we follow Sethi and
Yilditz (2012) in dening the information structure and communication pro-
tocol. In order to reconcile various examples of public disagreement with
public agreement under common priors in the literature, Sethi and Yilditz
(2012) consider a model in which a nite set of agents with normally dis-
tributed di¤erentiated priors and independent private signals about the rel-
evant state of the world sequentially communicate through truthful public
announcement of their beliefs until no further belief revision occurs. They
study whether or not all distributed information is aggregated through com-
munication, and compare the extent of disagreement under observable- and
unobservable priors.8 When priors are unobservable and imperfectly corre-
8Observable priors are interpreted as understanding the thought processes and per-
spectives of others arising from social integration.
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lated, the agents infer each other priors after two rounds of communication
from reactions to the initial announcements. We build on this insight by
allowing the agents to form various networks and then communicate through
network links, limiting communication to two periods.9 Public communica-
tion in Sethi and Yilditz corresponds to communication through completely
connected network.
Second, one of our two simplifying assumptions is reminiscent of Li and
Tan (2020). They assume that the agents know only their local networks.
Failure to account for replicated signals leads to errors. Interconnections
help avoiding such errors. The agents learn correctly when the network is
a social quilt (a tree-like union of cliques or clusters). Such a positive
role of clustering is yet another point in common with our paper. However,
our reason for clustering is di¤erent. Our players have a better knowledge of
network and so they do not double countthe signals. Clustering helps them
to learn each otherspriors and extract each otherssignals from messages.
As already mentioned, networks in our paper are endogenous, unlike Li and
Tan (2020).
2 Basic model.
Network formation. An arbitrarily large number of players,10 indexed
with i, build a network in order to exchange their private signals on the
9Recall footnote 1.
10It is common in the literature to consider a nite number of players. Our results
hold qualitatively under this assumption. However, the statements are conditional on
divisibility of the number of players on some integers. In order to simplify the exposition,
we assume that there are innitely many players and put an upper limit on the size of
network component (see the next paragraph).
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relevant state of Nature though its links, as described below. Each player
can build at most n links with other players.11
Link formation is simultaneous and unilateral, as in Bala and Goyal
(2000): players i and j become linked i¤ either- or both of them build such a
link. Following common notations, we indicate the presence of link between
players i and j with gj;i = 1 and its absence with gj;i = 0. Each prole of
linking choices induces an undirected network. We assume that the size of
network component is limited from above by M .12 For expositional purpose,
we rst assume that there exists a natural number m such that
M = 2n+ 1 + (2n  1)m. (1)
Section 6 extends our results to situation without equation (1).
We focus on equilibria in which network components are identical. We
denote representative network component with g and the set of all possible
representative network components with G. Hereafter, network gstands
for network composed of components g.
Set of notations 1. Let us now introduce some concepts related to net-
work architecture. All these concepts are specic to network g  G organising
the players.13 Figure 1 illustrates these concepts.
Player j is distance-1 neighbour or friendby player i if they are directly
connected, that is, gij = 1. We assume that each player i is directly connected
11Hence, the cost of a link is an opportunity cost rather than direct cost, akin to Bloch
and Dutta (2009). In their model, the players allocate a given endowment across links
which results in links of di¤erent intensity. We do not study link intensity.
12Recall footnote 10.
13However, we will use notations which do not reect this fact, for notational conve-
nience.
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with himself, that is, gii = 1. The set of player is neighbours (including
himself) is denoted by:
Ni = fj 2 g j gi;j = 1g , (2)
and player is degree by
di = jNij .
Player j is closed neighbour by player i i¤ any friend of j is also a friend
of i. The set of closed neighbours by player i is denoted by




Player j is open neighbour by player i i¤ j has at least one friend who is
not a friend of i. The set of open neighbours by player i is denoted by

N i = NinN i; (4)
and their number by

di =
 N i :
Distance-2 neighbours by player i are the friends of is friends. Their set
is denoted by
N 0i = fj 2 g j gi;j = 0 and Ni \Nj 6= ?g ; (5)
and their number by
d0i = jN 0i j : (6)
9




d2 = 1, N 0i = f1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7; 8g ; d0i = 8, N1n2 = f6; 7; 8g ; djni = 3:
The set of distance-2 neighbours by player i connected with i through player
j14 is denoted by
Njni = NjnNi; (7)
and their number by
djni =
Njni :
Total number of neighbours by player i refers to the sum of is distance-1
and distance-2 neighbours: d0i + di.
Playerspriors and signals. The information structure follows Sethi
and Yilditz (2012): The players have heterogenous imperfectly correlated
priors about the relevant state of Nature
x  N(0; 1). (8)
Di¤erentiated priors reect di¤erentiated manners in which the players process
new information. Say, each player i considers a subset of available historical
facts to be relevant for understanding the state. His estimator of the state
14And possibly some other players.
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conditional on this subset of facts is his prior pi. Player is prior pi is his
private information and he cannot directly communicate this information to
the other players (that is, he cannot describe to the other players the way
in which he thinks). However, it is commonly known that the playerspriors
are distributed according to a joint normal distribution:
p = (p1; ::::)
T  N(0; 2), (9)
where variance-covariance matrix  has elements 1 on the main diagonal
and  elsewhere.15 For concreteness, we assume that correlation  is positive
(following the above interpretation of di¤erentiated priors, each player i as-
signs a positive probability to any other player j paying attention to some
historical facts which i considers relevant).
The players receive private signals on the state of Nature x. Private signal
by player i is
si = x+ "i, where "i  N(0; 1). (10)
The signals by di¤erent players are independent.
Set of notations 2. Conditionally on his prior (or type) pi, player i
believes that the law of (x; (pj)j2gni; ("j)j2g) denoted Pi is a multidimensional
normal distribution given by
Pi = N (pi; 1)
N (pi1; b)
N (0;  2I)
with bj;l = 2(1  2) if j = l;2(1  ) if j 6= l;
15For simplicity, we assume that all o¤ diagonal elements of variace-covariance matrix
 are the same. It is straightforward to extend our results to an alternative assumption
because we will be focusing on arbitrarily small correlation (see Assumption 1 below).
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where 1 = (1; 1; :::; 1)T and I denotes the identity matrix. We use: Ei to
denote the expectation under Pi, Vi to denote the variance under Pi, Ci to
denote the covariance under Pi, and Li to denote the law (or conditional law)
of some variable under Pi.
Learning through network. The players communicate through the
network in discrete time periods. Communication is modeled as simultaneous
truthful announcement of beliefs summarized by estimator of the state, as
in Sethi and Yilditz (2012) and the literature they build on.16 We reduce
communication to a nite number of periods, which reects the playersim-
patience. For simplicity, there are two periods (t = 1; 2). In the rst period,
player is announcement or message is his expectation of the state conditional
on his signal given by equation (10):
mi(1) = Ei (x j si) . (11)
His message in period 2 is his expectation of the state conditional on his
signal and messages sent by his neighbours during the rst period of com-
munication:17
mi(2) = Ei (x j si, fmj(1) j j 2 Nig) . (12)
16It is important for our insights that the players cannot transmit the set of tagged
messages received from their neighbours. It is also important that they cannot announce
their priors. The focus on truthful communication is without loss of generality in the sense
that if strategic communication is allowed for, truthful communication is an equilibrium
(see Remark 1).
17For notational convenience, we do not reect the fact thatmi(2) is network dependent.
12
Payo¤s. Player is disutility or loss is the variance of x given his private
signal and the signals he has received in communication phase:18
li(g) = Vi (x j si, fmj(t) j j 2 Ni; t = 1; 2g) . (13)
Treating Bayesian learning on networks: two simplifying as-
sumptions. We assume that learning through network is Bayesian, which
is known to be di¢ cult to handle. We achieve tractability via two assump-
tions described just below. Our numerical ndings in Section 7 suggest that
our insights hold without these simplifying assumptions.
Our rst simplifying assumption concerns information structure.
Assumption 1. Correlation  is arbitrarily small.
Our second simplifying assumption (akin to Li and Tan, 2020) concerns
a players knowledge of network. We assume that each player i knows his
immediate (distance-1) neighbours. However, he has imperfect knowledge of
network outside his local neighborhood.
Assumption 2. A player knows sizes of his distant neighborhoods and
he forms some beliefs about network architecture consistent with that knowl-
edge, assuming away any common friendships outside his neighborhood. It is
common knowledge that any player holds such beliefs.
We focus on two-period communication. Therefore, let us specify a players








18For example, we could think of player i taking private action and inquiring a loss
which is equal to squared distance between his action and the state (the optimal action).
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and he forms some beliefs about network architecture consistent with that
knowledge, assuming that his open neighbours have no common friendships
outside his neighbourhood:
Njni \Nkni = ? for any pair j 2

N i and k 2

N i. (14)
For example, suppose that player i has two open neighbours j and k. Neigh-
bour j connects i to two distance-2 neighbours, (djni = 2); neighbour k con-
nects i to three distance-2 neighbours (dkni = 3), of which one is connected
to i through j (
Njni \Nkni = 1), as illustrated in Figure 2.a. Player i knows
that he has d0i = 4 distance-2 neighbours. He (mistakenly) assumes that j and
k have no common friendships outside his neighborhood (Njni \ Nkni = ?),
and holds any of the following beliefs: (i) j connects him to one distance-
2 neighbour (djni = 1) and k connects him to three distance-2 neighbours
(dkni = 3), see Figure 2.b; (ii) either open neighbour connects him to two
distance-2 neighbours (djni = dkni = 2), see Figure 2.c; (iii) j connects him to
three distance-1 neighbours (djni = 3) and k connects him to one distance-2
neighbour (dkni = 3), see Figure 2.d.
3 Network architecture and a players payo¤.
We rst describe how a players payo¤ is related to the architecture of his
network component. To this goal, we inquire in a players learning from his
neighboursmessages.
14
Figure 2: (a) True network. (b)-(d) Possible beliefs by player i.
15
Learning from closed neighbours (Sethi and Yilditz, 2012). By
standard formula for Gaussian updating,19 the rst message by is neighbor
j is a linear combination of js prior pj and js private signal sj. The noisier
the signal, the higher weight is put on the prior:







From message (15), player i deduces js signal sj with additional noise
 2 (pj   Ei(pj j pi)) associated with is uncertainty regarding js priors: 
1 +  2

mj(1)   2Ei(pj j pi) = sj +  2 (pj   Ei(pj j pi)) , (16)
where
Ei(pj j pi) = pi: (17)
In the second period of communication, player is neighbour j updates
his beliefs about the state using the signals deduced from his neighborsrst
messages (see equation (16) in which index i is replaced for j and index j is
replaced for k). Player js second message is a linear combination of his own
rst message, the sum of his neighboursrst messages and his priors:
mj(2) = Ej

x j sj; fmk(1)gk2Njnfjg

= (1  (di   1))mj(1)+
 (1 +  2)
P
k2Njnfjg




19Appendix A reviews relevant facts from statistics and linear algebra. Appendix B uses
these facts to prove the statements of this section.
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Suppose that j is a closed neighbour by i, that is, j 2 N i. Then, player i
knows all the rst messages fmk(1)gk2Nj by js neighbours (including is own
message), and therefore can deduce js priors from equation (18), and then
js private signal sj from equation (15). Put a bit informally, by observing
js reaction to the rst messages by js neighbours (which player i hears
too), player i learns the way in which j processes new information, and can
thereby deduce js private signal from js rst message.
Lemma 1 (learning from closed neighbours). Suppose j is a closed
neighbour by player i ( j 2 N i). Then, i learns js signal and prior after two
rounds of communication.
Player i can use the priors and signals by his closed neighbors to update
his beliefs about the state:























and the priors by the players outside his closed neighborhood:
p = Ei
























where k 2 gnN i, and l 2 gnN i [ fkg.
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Learning from open neighbours. Now, let us describe player is
learning from open neighbours. We will use standard formula for Bayesian
updating and our simplifying assumptions. Consider an open neighbour
j 2 Ni by player i. By equation (16), in which is expectation of js priors
conditional on is own prior, that is (17), are replaced with that conditional
on the priors by all is closed neighbours (including himself), that is, with
(22), player i deduces a noisy signal on js private signal:
esj(1) = (1 +  2)mj(1)   2p = x+ "j +  2(pj   p) (25)
from js rst message (15). By equation (18), player i deduces signal







(pk   p)   2(dj   1)(pj   p)
1A
(26)
from js second message.
Let us index is open neighbours with
j 2

di + 1; :::; di
	
. (27)
Let es(t) = (esdi+1(t); :::; esdi(t)).
Bayesian updating implies
Li(x; es(1); es(2)j fsj; pjgj2 Ni) = N xi1; v v1Tv1 

; (28)
where xi is given by equation (20), v is given by equation (21) and  is
a square symmetric matrix of size 2di. In order to apply standard formula
for Bayesian updating, we use our two simplifying assumptions highlighted
18
above: we focus on correlation of priors  being arbitrarily small and we make
player i assume that his open neighbours (would he has more than one) have
no common friendships outside is neighborhood. Under these assumptions









if k = l > di +

di;
v; if k 6= l,
(29)
where v is given by equation (21) and
z =  2
 
1 +  22

. (30)
Notably, matrix k;l can be represented as a sum of two matrixes of dimension
2di: matrix vI1T (with elements equal to v) of rank 1 and a diagonal matrix
zG. This decomposition allows us to invert matrix  (Miller, 1981). We then
nd the sum of elements of the inverted matrix, hence, an explicit expression













Proposition 1 (network architecture and a players payo¤). A
players loss is given by equation (31).
Hence, a players loss is determined by two variables related to network
architecture: (i) the total number of neighbors (distance-1 and distance-2)
and (ii) the number of closed neighbours. It is decreasing in both these
variables. Relative value of the number of closed neighbors is the higher, the
stronger the transmission noise 22.
20We describe the elements of matrix  without the simplifying assumptions in Appendix
B and use it in Section 7.
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Let us take a step away from our analysis and use these insights to make
the following remark regarding our communication protocol.
Remark 1 (truthful vs. strategic communication). If strategic
communication is allowed for, truthful communication is an equilibrium.
Indeed, consider the situation in which all players truthfully announce
their estimate of the state during either round of communication and believe
the others to do so. If player i deviates by sending a message di¤erent from
his true estimate of the state (during either round of communication), he
learns the same information from his neighboursmessages as when he does
not deviate, as long as they believe him to tell the truth and react accordingly.
Namely, he deduces the priors by his neighbour j from equation (18) and then
his signals from equation (15) if j is closed. Otherwise, i deduces signals (25)
and (26) from js messages. This is true for any is neighbour j. Hence, is
payo¤ is given by equation (31), no matter whether i deviates from truthful
communication or not.
4 Bunches of owers: a family of Nash equi-
librium networks.
This section describes a family of Nash equilibrium networks possessing fea-
tures of real networks highlighted in introduction. Let us dene a set of
concepts related to a network from this family.
Denition 1 (ower, hub, peripheral player, the large petal and
small petals). Flower fk,21 where full number k; 0 6 k 6 m, organizes
21We borrow terminology owerfrom Bala and Goyal (2000) who have introduced it
for directed networks.
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Figure 3: M = 11, n = 2. Left: k = m = 2; right: k = 0:
jfkj = 2n + 1 + (2n   1)k players. The central hub h is linked with all
the peripheral players, that is, fih = 1 8 i 2 fk. The peripheral players
are divided into interconnected petals: Ni = Nj for any i 6= h and for any
j 2 Nin fhg. One petal (hereafter, the large petal) has size 2n and k other
petals (hereafter, small petals) have size 2n  1.
Figure 3 illustrates the concepts introduced by denition 1. It focuses on
the situation in which each player has two hands(n = 2) and the maximal
size of component is M = 11 (and so, by equation (1), m = 2).
Figure 3, left depicts ower f2 organizing 11 players (the central hub and
10 peripheral players) divided into k = m = 2 small petals and one large
petal. Flower f2 can be built up as follows. Four peripheral players from
the large petal and the central hub interconnect: they form a circle and each
player connects to the next two players on his right. At the same time, three
peripheral players from either small petal form a circle and each of them
connects to the central hub and the peripheral player on his right.
Let us ask whether the above strategy prole is a Nash equilibrium? By
21
proposition 1, a players deviation can only be protable if it increases either
the number of his closed neighbours or the total number of his neighbours.
Note, however, the total number of any players neighbours is equal to the
components size, that is, 11. It cannot be any higher, for cross component
deviations are ruled out by the limitation on the maximal size of component.
Furthermore, no player can increase the number of his closed neighbours by
unilateral deviation. Hence, the ower depicted in Figure 3, left is a Nash
equilibrium. Note that by the same argument, ower depicted in Figure 1 is
a Nash equilibrium, if we keep assuming that n = 2 and M = 11.
Now, consider Figure 3, right. It depicts completely connected graph or-
ganizing 5 players. It may be viewed as ower f0 without small petals. Flower
f0 can built up as follows: they form a circle and each player connects to
the next two players on his right. When this strategy prole is a Nash equi-
librium? Once again, there is no way a player can increase the number of
his closed neighbours by unilateral deviation. However, any player can cut
one of the links within the same component and link to a player from a dif-
ferent component. Thereby, he losses 4 closed neighbours and increases the
total number of neighbours by 5. By proposition 1, this is not a good deal
i¤ transmission noise is su¢ ciently high, that is 2 2 > 5
4
. Hence, ower f0
is an equilibrium i¤ transmission noise is su¢ ciently high and so is the value
of closed neighbours.
Generalization of the argument presented in the above two paragraphs
leads to the following set of results.
Proposition 2 (a family of Nash equilibrium networks). Consider
network fk composed of owers with k small petals, where 0 6 k 6 m. (i)
22
If k > m
2
  2n+1




2(2n 1) , then network fk is a Nash equilibrium i¤ 
2 2 > jfkj
2n 2 . (iii)
Network f0 composed of completely connected clusters is a Nash equilibrium
i¤ 2 2 > 2n+1
2n
.
Proposition 2 says that a ower network composed of su¢ ciently large
components (or, equivalently, components with su¢ ciently many petals) is
an equilibrium. A ower network composed of components with a smaller
number of petals is also an equilibrium i¤ transmission noise is su¢ ciently
high and so is the value of closed neighbours.
The formal proof is in Appendix C. It goes along the following lines.
Flower fk can be built up as follows: 2n peripheral players from the large
petal and the central hub interconnect: they form a circle and each player
connects to the next n players on his right. At the same time, 2n   1 pe-
ripheral players from a small petal (if any)22 form a circle and each of them
connects to the central hub and n  1 peripheral player on his right.
First, consider a ower composed of su¢ ciently large components fk, or,





so that deviations leading to connections of di¤erent components are ruled
out by the upper limitation on a components size. Consider possible devi-
ations within the same component. There is no protable deviation for the
hub, as he learns private signals by all the players in his component. Con-
sider a peripheral player i from a small petal (the reasoning is similar for the
peripheric player from the large petal). Player i can deviate in two ways,
22If k = 0, there are no small petals.
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Figure 4: Possible deviations by player i within the same component: dotted
red line marks the scaried link, solid red line marks the established link.
illustrated by Figure 4:23 (i) Link with a player from a di¤erent petal instead
of a player in the same petal (Figure 4, left). (ii) Link with a player from a dif-
ferent petal instead of the hub (Figure 4, right). Neither deviation increases
the total number of is neighbours24 and both deviations decrease the number
of is closed neighbours. Hence both deviations are lossful. Therefore, a net-
work composed of fk where k is su¢ ciently high, as described by inequality
(32) is a Nash equilibrium. This is the rst statement of proposition 2.
Now consider networks composed of fk, where k is (weakly) below the
threshold indicated by inequality (32). First, consider the hub of one com-
ponent. He could deviate by linking to a player in a di¤erent component
instead of linking with peripheral player from the large petal in his compo-
23Figure 4 illustrates deviations by peripheral player in a small petal of size 2n   1
leading to his direct connection with the large petal of size 2n. Our argument, however
holds for any deviation by peripheral player leading to direct connection with peripheral
player in a di¤erent petal, either large or small.
24Indeed, the deviation depicted in Figure 4, right decreases the total number of is
neighbours if the ower has more than two petals.
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Figure 5: Possible deviations across di¤erent components: dotted red line
marks the scaried link, solid red line marks the established link.
nent. Thereby, he would increase the total number of his neighbours at a
price of loosing 2n closed neighbours. The increase in the total number of
neighbours is the highest if the deviating hub links with a hub from a di¤er-
ent component (see Figure 5, left). In such a way the deviating hub doubles
the total number of his neighbours. However, even this optimal deviation is
unprotable if transmission noise 2 2 is su¢ ciently high:
2 2 > jfkj
2n
, (33)
where jfkj = 2n+ 1 + (2n  1)k denotes the size of fk.
Next, consider a peripheral player j from the large petal. His most prof-
itable deviation consists of linking to the hub from a di¤erent component in-
stead of linking to another peripheral player in his petal. Thereby, he doubles
the total number of neighbours at a price of loosing 2n 1 closed neighbours
(all players in his petal but himself). The deviation is unprotable i¤
2 2 > jfkj
2n 1 . (34)
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Finally, consider a peripheral player i from a small petal (see Figure 5,
right).25 The optimal deviation for such a player, once again, is linking to
the hub from a di¤erent component instead of linking to another peripheral
player in his petal. Thereby, he doubles the total number of neighbours at a
price of loosing 2n  2 closed neighbours. The deviation is unprotable i¤
2 2 > jfkj
2n 2 . (35)
Note that conditions (33) to (35) are increasingly strong: players with fewer
closed neighbours value them more and are less willing to deviate. This leads
us to statements (ii) and (iii) in proposition 2.
5 E¢ cient networks.
Proposition 2 describes a family of Nash equilibrium networks with relevant
features.26 Let us now ask which networks are most desirable or e¢ cient? Do
they belong to the family of networks which we have described?
For the sake of tractability, we take Rawlsian e¢ ciency criterion.27 While
not common in the literature, this choice may be justied by the fact that any
player can nd himself in the role of the least happy player in the network.
25Note that a small petal exist i¤ k > 0.
26There are Nash equilibrium networks outside the family described in Proposition 2.
For example, suppose M = 8, n = 2. Suppose the players locate in circle and each
player gives two handsto players on his right. The resulting wheelnetwork is a Nash
equilibrium: each player has degree 2n+ 1 = 5; no closed neighbours except himself, and
8 neighbours in total. No player can deviate so as to increase its closed degree (which is at
minimum) or its total degree (which is at maximum). Note, however, that this example
does not extend to su¢ ciently large M . For example, any player in a wheel organizing 11
players has the incentives to replace the link with his immediate neighbour on the right
by the link with a player on the opposite side of the wheel.
27Utilitarian cirterion is most common in the literature. As already mentioned in in-
troduction, numerical results in Section 7 suggest that our insights may hold if we use
normalized utilitarian criterion (the average loss).
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Denition 2 (robust network). The network is e¢ cient in Rawlsian
sense or robust28 i¤ it minimizes the loss by the least happy player. The set






Which networks are robust? We nd that the set of robust networks is
composed of the network with completely connected components f0 and the
network composed of owers fm of maximal size (Figure 3 depicts the set of
robust networks for n = 2, M = 11). When the transmission noise 2 2 is
su¢ ciently low, network fm maximizing the number of closed neighbours by
the least happy player (a peripheral player from small petal) while keeping
the number of total neighbours at maximum outperforms f0. In the comple-
mentary situation, network f0 maximizing the number of closed neighbours
by the least happy player without any constraint outperforms fm:
Proposition 3 (characterization of robust networks). For each
value of transmission noise 2 2 except one point the set of robust networks
G is a singleton. It is described as follows.
G =
8><>:
ff0g , if 2 2 > (2n 1)m2 ,
ffmg , if 2 2 < (2n 1)m2 ,
ff0; fmg , if 2 2 = (2n 1)m2 .
The formal proof of proposition 3 is in Appendix D. Roughly, it goes as
follows. We divide all networks into those with equal degree distribution with
full use of linking capacity:
 = fg 2 G j di = 2n+ 1 for any i 2 gg (37)
28We abuse term robustused by the literature on mechanism design.
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and the remaining networks. Set  is composed of networks in which each
player has 2n links (hence, his degree is 2n+ 1)29. These include network f0
depicted in Figure 3, right and also wheelnetworks.30 Networks outside
set  include owers with at least one small petal and other networks.
We note, rst, that any network g outside set  and di¤erent from fm
is not robust. The reason is that by denition of set , there exist player
i in g who has at most 2n   1 neighbours but himself. If all of them are
closed, then player i has a higher loss than any player in network f0 who
has 2n neighbours but himself, all of whom are closed. In the complementary
situation, player i has at least one open neighbour. Hence, player i has
at most as many closed neighbours as any of the least happyplayers in
fm, that is, any of peripheral players from small petals, say player k. By
denition ofM , player i has at most as many neighbours in total as player k.
Hence, is loss is weakly higher than ks. However, if any player in g who has
at most 2n  1 neighbours but himself has exactly the same loss as player k,
then g coincides with fm (the proof of this statement goes by construction).
Because we consider g di¤erent from fm, at least one player in g has a higher
loss than player k.
It remains to compare performance of networks in set  with that of
fm. First, consider a wheel network. In this network, any player has at
most M neighbours in total and only one closed neighbour (himself). By
proposition 1, his loss is higher than that by a peripheral player from fm.
29Recall that we include a player in the set of his neighbours.
30A wheel network can be built up as follows: the players form circles with at least 2n+2
players in each circle, and each player in a circle connects to the next n players on his
right. The more players are in a circle, the higher the diameter of the wheels composing
the network.
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Now, let us consider network f0. By equation (31), network f0 outperforms
fm i¤ transmission noise 2 2 is su¢ ciently high (and so is the value of closed
neighbours), namely,




2 2 > (2n 1)m
2
, (38)
where m is given by equation (1). This comparison completes the proof of
proposition 3.
Remark 2. The unique (except at one point of parameter space) robust
network characterized by proposition 3 is a Nash equilibrium. It has promi-
nent features of real networks.
The proof of remark 2 follows from proposition 2 (see Appendix E).
Hence, in our game, the players may form robust networks while building
links with their private interests in mind. Furthermore, the robust network
is unique (except at one point). Therefore, robustness may be used to select
the relevant equilibrium.
6 Generalized model.
While proposition 1 holds generally, propositions 2 and 3 where obtained
under restriction (1) onM . We shall now extend their insights to the situation
without that restriction. Without loss of generality,
M = 1 + (2n  1)(m+ 1) + r, (39)
where r is a natural number in interval 0 6 r 6 2n  2 and m > 0. Equation
(1) is equivalent to r = 1. We will now consider other possible values of r.
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Figure 6: Symmetric ower ef2 with linking capacity n = 2.
6.1 A family of Nash equilibrium networks and the
robust network when r = 0.
First, suppose that r = 0, that is,
M = 1 + (2n  1)(m+ 1). (40)
Denition 3 (symmetric ower). Symmetric ower efk, where k 2 Z;
1 6 k 6 m, organizes
 efk = 1+(2n 1)(k+1) players. The central hub h is
linked with all the peripheral players, that is, efih = 1 8 i 2 efk. The peripheral
players are divided into interconnected petals: Ni = Nj for any i 6= h and
for any j 2 Nin fhg. All petals have size 2n  1.
Figure 6 illustrates symmetric ower with k+1 = 3 petals of size 2n 1 =
2  2   1 = 3 each. It may be built in di¤erent ways. For example, it may
be entirely built by peripheral players who organize in circles and then each
gives one handto the hub and the other to the player on his right. It may
also be built with the hubs participation. Whether- and when one of these
30
strategy proles is a Nash equilibrium?
Proposition 4 (a family of Nash equilibrium networks when
r = 0). Suppose that r = 0. Symmetric ower efk is a Nash equilibrium
i¤ k is su¢ ciently high, as described by inequality (41).
The formal proof of proposition 4 is in Appendix E. It goes along the
following lines. Network efk may be built via di¤erent strategy proles (as
illustrated by the above example). In any of these strategy proles peripheral
players in the same petal interconnect and link to the central hub without
replicating links which may be created by the hub. Some connection capacity
(n links) remains unused. Therefore, at least one player has a free hand.
This implies that if the size of a component is su¢ ciently small, so that





then network efk is not a Nash equilibrium. Indeed, a player with a free hand
gains by deviating and linking to the central hub of a di¤erent component. If
inequality (41) does not hold, no player has a protable deviation from any of
the strategy proles leading to formation of efk, because deviations within the
same component weakly decrease the number of closed neighbours without
increasing the total number of neighbours (which is maximal).
We now proceed with characterization of robust networks.
Proposition 5 (the robust network when r = 0). Suppose that r = 0.
For each value of transmission noise 2 2 except one point the set of robust
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networks G is a singleton. It is described as follows.
G =
8>><>>:
ff0g , if 2 2 > (2n 1)m 12 ,nefmo , if 2 2 < (2n 1)m 12 ,n
f0; efmo , if 2 2 = (2n 1)m 12 .
The formal proof of proposition 4 is in Appendix D. It goes along the
lines of proof of proposition 3. The intuition is also similar. Symmetric
ower efm maximizes the number of closed neighbours by his least happy
member subject to keeping the number of his total neighbours at maximum.
It therefore dominates all networks but f0 which maximizes the number of
closed neighbours by his least happy member without a constraint (delivering
him less neighbours in total than network efm). It also dominates network f0
i¤ transmission noise 2 2 lies below some threshold, and so the value of
closed neighbours is su¢ ciently low.
6.2 A family of Nash equilibrium networks and the
robust network when r > 2.
Suppose now that r > 2. Suppose we want to divide M   1 players in petals
of sizes as equal as possible. This can be accomplished in the following way:
start with one petal of size 2n, m petals of size 2n  1 and one petal of size
r   1 and repetitively move one player from the largest existing petal to the
smallest petal until the distribution of petalssizes becomes constant (and
di¤erence between the petals sizes becomes no higher than one). As a result,
the size of (one of) the smallest petal(s), or, using common terminology,31
31Bala and Goyal (2000) introduced this terminology for directed networks.
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The resulting network belongs to the family of networks dened as follows.
Denition 4 (generalized ower). A generalized ower of size K and
level-s is a network 's;K organizing
's;K = K players. The unique central
hub h is linked with all the peripheral players. The peripheral players are
divided into interconnected petals: Ni = Nj for any i 6= h and for any
j 2 Nin fhg. The smallest petal(s) has(have) size s. The set of generalized
owers of level-s and size K is denoted by s;K .
Figure 7 depicts generalized ower of size 9 and level 2. It may be build
via di¤erent proles of strategies, including those in which all links are built
by peripheral players and others in which the central hub builds some links.
A family of Nash equilibrium networks with r > 2. When a
network in set s;K is a Nash equilibrium?
Proposition 5 (a family of Nash equilibrium networks when
r > 2). Suppose r > 2. For any natural number s in the interval 1 6 s 6
2n  2, any network in set s;K is a Nash equilibrium i¤ 2K > M .
The formal proof or proposition 6 is in Appendix G. It is very similar to
the proof of proposition 4. Consider network 's;K in set s;K . It can be built
in di¤erent ways including the following: peripheral players from the same
33
Figure 7: Generalized ower of size 9 and level 2.
petal locate in a circle, each of them connects to the central hub and the
least of n  1 on his right and all remaining players in the petal. Note that





so that bridging di¤erent components is not feasible, no player has a prof-
itable deviation from the above strategy prole. Indeed, all the players have
K neighbours in total in equilibrium. By inequality (44), they cannot in-
crease this number by deviation. By proposition 1, the only way to gain
is to increase the number of closed neighbours. However, this cannot be
accomplished by a unilateral deviation.
Suppose now that K 6 M
2
. Note that no matter the strategy prole
through which network 's;K was built, at least one peripheral player from
(one of) the smallest petals of size s has a free hand (that is, unused
connection capacity or capacity used to duplicate some link(s)). This player
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can protably deviate by linking to the hub from a di¤erent component.
Strictly robust networks with r > 2. Recall that in cases r = 1
and r = 0 we have found the unique robust network (except at one point
of parameter space), and this network was a Nash equilibrium. We could
therefore use robustness as an equilibrium renement. Now, we focus on
r > 2. In this situation, multiple networks may be robust. For example,
when n = 2 and M = 9, the network in Figure 6 is robust, but the network
of 9 players with one petal of 4 players and two petals of 2 players is robust
too.
In order to get a smaller set of selected equilibria, let us can rene our




for the set of the least happy players (losers) in network g. We now proceed
with rening the concept of robustness.
Denition 5 (strictly robust networks). The network is strictly ro-
bust if it minimizes the number of the least happy players among the robust




Note that the set of robust networks and strictly robust networks coincide
when r 6 1 (that is, in the complementary case to that in focus of this
section). Hence, propositions 3 and 5 characterize strictly robust networks
when r = 1 and r = 0 correspondingly. Let us now characterize strictly
robust networks when r > 2.
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Proposition 7 (strictly robust networks when r > 2). Suppose





ff0g , if 2 2 > (2n 1)m2 ,
ff0; fmg , if 2 2 = (2n 1)m2 ,
ffmg , if r 12n 1 s < 
2 2 < (2n 1)m
2
,
ffmg [ s;M , if 2 2 = r 12n 1 s ,




ff0g , if 2 2 > (2n 1)m+r 12n+1 s ,
ff0g [ s;M , if 2 2 = (2n 1)m+r 12n+1 s ,
s;M , if 2 2 <
(2n 1)m+r 1
2n+1 s .
The formal proof is Appendix I. It starts with showing that any strictly
robust network di¤erent from networks f0 and fm is in set s;M . The proof
goes by contradiction. We consider a network di¤erent from either network
f0 and fm and outside set s;M . We divide the players in this network into
three complementary groups: (i) the players whose closed degree is at most
2n   1; (ii) the players whose closed degree is at least 2n and the same is
true for any of their closed neighbours and (iii) the remaining players.
We rst show that players in group (i) are divided into clusters or petals.
That is, any of them has the same closed neighbourhood as any of his closed
neighbours. The key observation for that result is that in order for g to
be robust it is necessary that any player in group (i) has at least s closed
neighbours. Would the petals overlap, there would be a player in group (i)
whose closed degree is at least 2s, which by inequality (43) contradicts the
denition of group (i). Furthermore, any of the players in group (i) shall be
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connected to the central hub, so that he has su¢ ciently many neighbours in
total and g is not dominated by fm.
Then, we show that given the available liking capacity and g being dif-
ferent from f0, the players in group (ii) form completely connected cluster
together with the central hub, would group (ii) be full.
Finally, we note that all players in group (iii) are also connected to the
central hub (because each of them has at least one closed neighbour from
group (i) who, recall, has such a connection). Hence, the total number of
neighbours of any player is equal to the components size. By proposition
1, a players relative loss is dened by his closed degree. Therefore, the least
happy players are in group (i), and the central hub is in group (iii). Suppose
some other player bh in also in group (iii). Then g is not strictly robust because
the loss of the least happy player from one of the petals in group (i) can be
reduced by making player bh a part of their petal (note that this is done
without hurting any of the other least happy players).
By construction, g is in set s;jgj. Note that jgj 6 M . At the same time,
jgj > fm. Suppose that
fm < jgj < M .
That is,
jgj = 1 + (2n  1)(m+ 1) + br, (46)
where br < r. If we divide jgj   1 players into petals so as to maximize the
size of the minimal petal using the procedure described in the rst paragraph
of (this) section 6.2, we nd that the size of the smallest petal is below s.
Therefore, g is dominated by any network in set s;M .
We complete our characterization of strictly robust networks by compar-
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ing performance of networks in set s;M with that of fm and f0, and we the
result stated in proposition 7.
Hence, the insights of sections 4 and 5 obtained under restriction (1) on
M generalize to the case without that restriction: The game has equilibria
in which the players form robust networks. These networks have features
observed in real networks.
7 Numerical ndings.
Let us now verify numerically whether the above insights continue to hold
when we abandon our simplifying assumptions 1 and 2. For the sake of com-
putational feasibility we consider the situation where each player has two
hands, that is, n = 2 and the size of the component is at most M = 8.
Theoretical predictions under assumptions 1 and 2:
(T1) By proposition 3, if 2 2 6 3
2
, ower network depicted in Figure 1
(hereafter, the ower network) is robust; if 2 2 > 3
2
, completely connected
cluster depicted in Figure 3, right is robust.
(T2) By proposition 2, robust network is a Nash equilibrium.
Let us explore numerically whether- and when theoretical predictions
(T1) and (T2) hold (qualitatively) without simplifying assumptions 1 and 2.
In order to verify prediction (T1), we normalize  2 = 1, let  take values
in set f0:1; 0:2; 0:35; 0:5; 0:7; 0:9g, vary transmission noise2 and compare
losses by the least happy player in all possible graphs of size 8 at most.
Figure 8, left illustrates our ndings for  = 0:35 (the gures for  = 0:1
and  = 0:2 are similar). 1106 graphs of size 8 are colored green, 59 graphs of




Figure 8: Playerslosses in di¤erent networks: the largest (left), the average
(right). Networks of size 8 are colored with green, of size 7 with blue, of
size 6 with red. The ower network is furthermore marked with red dots.
Completely connected cluster is marked with grey dashed line.
player in the completely connected cluster marked with grey horizontal line.
We do not depict the loss by the least happy player in graphs of size at most 5
because it is limited from below by 1
6
. The green curve marked with red dots
depicts the loss by the least happy player in the ower network. Apparently,
it lies below all the other curves if 2 is su¢ ciently low. Otherwise, the grey
horizontal line is the lowest. We nd similar insights if Rawlsian e¢ ciency
criterion is replaced with normalized utilitarian, that is, the average loss,32
(see Figure 8, right).
For higher values of correlation  (see Figure 9) we nd in line with our
insights that completely connected cluster delivering the loss of 1
6
to any
player is robust when 2 is su¢ ciently high (see Figure 9, up). However,
for lower values of 2, other networks than the ower may be robust: the
highest loss in the ower network in Figure 9, up is marked with red dots
32There is no sense to compare the sum of players losses in components of di¤erent
sizes. Normalized utilitarian means that the objective is to minimize the average loss.
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Figure 9: Performance of di¤erent networks for su¢ ciently high values of
correlation .
40
when the ower outperforms all other networks di¤erent from the completely
connected cluster and with blue dots otherwise. This di¤erence with insight
(T1) may be caused by the fact that our payo¤(31) attributes the same value
to distance-1 open neighbours and distance-2 neighbours, while without
our simplifying assumptions the former value may lie above the latter. Figure
9, down shows that the situation is similar when we take utilitarian e¢ ciency
criterion (normalized to a components size).
In order to verify theoretical prediction (T2) without the simplifying as-
sumptions 1 and 2, we keep  2 = 1, let  take values in set f0:1; 0:2; 0:35g,
vary transmission noise2 and verify that the robust network is a Nash
equilibrium. Trivially, there are no protable deviations for any player in
completely connected cluster, hence, it is a Nash equilibrium for any 2.
Consider the ower network depicted in Figure 10, left, center. Trivially, the
hub cannot deviate in a protable way, as in equilibrium he learns the signals
by all the players in his component and receives payo¤ 1
9
. Possible deviations
by peripheral players are depicted in the right part of Figure 10. Peripheral
player 8 from the large petal can undertake either deviation 1 or deviation
2. Peripheral player 5 from the small petal can undertake either deviation
3 or deviation 4. Figure 11 depicts equilibrium losses by these players and
their losses under the above deviations, depending on transmission noise
2. Apparently, none of the above deviations is protable.
Numerical ndings without assumptions 1 and 2: Let  2 = 1. Let
 take values in set f0:1; 0:2; 0:35g.
(N1) The ower network is robust if transmission noise 2 is su¢ ciently
small. Otherwise, completely connected cluster is robust.
41
Figure 10: Flower network: equilibrium and possible deviations.
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(N2) The robust network is a Nash equilibrium.
(N3) Insights (N1) and (N2) hold for both Rawlsian- and normalized utili-
tarian e¢ ciency criteria, hence robustmay be replaced with e¢ cient.
(N4) Insight (N1) does not hold for  in set f0:5; 0:7; 0:9g.33
Hence, our numerical ndings suggest that our analytical insights ob-
tained under simplifying assumptions 1 and 2 hold qualitatively without
these assumptions when correlation of priors  is su¢ ciently small. Further-
more, these insights extend to utilitarian e¢ ciency criterion (normalized to
a components size).
8 Network formation with transferts.
This section briey discusses our modeling approach to network formation.
We follow the literature in which links are formed unilaterally. This may be
viewed as an extremely asymmetric investments in links. We will now modify
network formation stage of our model, following Hojman and Szeidl (2008),
so as to show that the above ower-like networks may be formed as a result
of more symmetric investments in links. Throughout this section we focus,
for simplicity, on the case investigated in Section 6.1, that is, r = 0.
Suppose that the network formation goes as follows. The players simul-
taneously choose their investments in links. Player i invests tji in link with
player j. The link between i and j is formed i¤ joint investment by players




33It seems that the threshold of correlation  below which our model performs well lies
somewhere inbetween 0:35 and 0:4.
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The communication stage is unchanged. Disutility by player i is given by
information loss (13) and the sum of is investments in links:
eli(g) = li(g) +P tji
j2g
. (47)
We are not aiming at detailed analysis of the modied game with trans-
fers. Rather, we will show that symmetric ower with petals of size 2n   1
organizingM players may be formed in equilibrium via a prole of strategies




in linking with each peripheral player i. Player i makes the remaining in-




Peripheral players divide into m + 1 petals of size 2n   1, and each pair of





Proposition 8 (formation of symmetric ower in the game with













then symmetric ower efm may be formed in equilibrium via prole of strate-
gies given by set of equations (48) to (50).
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The formal proof is in Appendix J. The argument goes as follows. The
above prole of strategies leads to formation of network (component) efm. Let
us show that no player has a protable deviation. First, consider the central
hub h. He can deviate by sacricing any subset of links, saving thereby sum
(48) multiplied by the cardinality of this subset. However, by convexity of
loss (31) in the number of closed neighbours dh, it su¢ ces to check that h is
not willing to deviate at the margin. This is the case because his contribution
(48) in linking with a peripheral player i is equal to his marginal bet from
this link, as it follows from equation (31) and the fact that if h sacrices the
link with one peripheral player i, he looses 2n  1 closed neighbours (all the
players in is petal).
Now, consider peripheral player i. He can deviate by not investing in
linking with any subset of his neighbours, as well as by creating links with
peripheral players outside his petal. Once again, by convexity of loss (31)
in either number of closed neighbours and total neighbours it is su¢ cient
to check that none of the following three deviations is protable: First, pe-
ripheral player i should not be willing to save c   tih and sacrice the link
with the central hub, loosing thereby all closed neighbours but himself and
keeping only 2n neighbours in total. Second, he should not be willing to save
c
2
sacricing a link with one of his closed neighbours in the petal, and loos-
ing thereby all closed neighbours but himself. By equation (31), these two
conditions are met if the cost c of a link is su¢ ciently small, namely it lies
below the upper limit of interval (51). Third, peripheral player i should not
be willing to pay c(2n  1) and build 2n  1 links with players in a di¤erent
petal. This condition is met when c lies above the lower limit of interval (51).
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It is straightforward to verify that the interval is full.
Let us conclude this section with an illustrative example. When  2 = 1,
2 = 3, M = 10 and n = 2, symmetric ower depicted in Figure 6 can be
built in by the following strategies: the central hub invests 0:02 in each link,
a peripheral player invests c 0:02 in the link with hub and c
2
in the link with
each peripheral player. This prole of strategies is an equilibrium i¤ c lies in
interval [0:02; 0:12]. Notice that for any c in interval [0:02; 0:04], symmetric
ower may be built via fully symmetric investments: a player invests c
2
in
any of his links.
9 Conclusion and open questions.
In this paper, we have rationalized prominent features of social networks with
signal-extraction benet by agents communicating through network links.
We have shown that networks with these features are e¢ cient in Rawlsian-
(and, possibly, in utilitarian) sense and they constitute an equilibrium.
Our analysis may be extended in the following directions. First, one can
try to rene our equilibrium concept in other ways than through robustness.
Apparently, strong Nash equilibrium is too strong in the sense that such
an equilibrium does not exist for a range of parameter values (see Appendix
K). Furthermore, ower networks are not coalition proof.34 However, one
may try to restricting attention to coalition proof Nash equilibria leading to
di¤erent network architectures.
Second, one could use utilitarian e¢ ciency criterion (normalized to a com-
ponents size)- rather than Rawlsian e¢ ciency criterion. Our numerical nd-
34Consider deviation by peripheral players forming a ower around di¤erent hub.
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ings suggest that proposition 3 may hold qualitatively.
Finally, one could extend our game to a longer communication horizon
(that is, more patient players), describe e¢ cient networks and verify whether
they constitute an equilibrium. We conjecture that e¢ cient networks become
less clustered as communication gets longer (see Appendix L). This research
direction, however, may be purely theoretical, given that Mobius, Phan and
Szeidl (2015) nd that information travels no further than two steps in the
conversation network.
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Appendix A: Technical review.
This section reviews formulas used in the paper. The notations are indepen-
dent from the rest of the paper.
Mean and Variance of a linear combination of Gaussian variables














Conditional multivariate normal distribution Consider n-dimensional
colomn-vector of random variables x distributed normally with mean  and
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n-by-n variance-covariance matrix : x  N (;). Consider the following

















where x1 is k-dimensional colomn-vector, x2 is (n  k)-dimensional colomn-
vector, 1 is k-dimensional colomn-vector, 2 is (n  k)-dimensional colomn-
vector, 11 is k-by-k matrix, 12 is k-by-(n  k) matrix, 21 is (n  k)-by-
k matrix, and 22 is (n  k)-by-(n  k) matrix. Suppose that realization
of the latter (n  k) components of vector x is known: x2 = a. Then,
(x1 j x2 = a)  N
b; b, where
b = 1 + 12 122 (a  2) , (52)
b = 11   12 122 21. (53)








where Ai;j is the i; jadjunct of matrix A, that is, the determinant of a matrix
received from A by removing row i and column j. In particular,0BB@
a b ::: b
b a :::
::: ::: b







a+ (n  2)b  b :::  b
 b a+ (n  2)b :::
::: :::  b
 b :::  b a+ (n  2)b
1CCA :
(55)
Let us introduce the following notation for the sum of elements of matrix
A:
Sum(A) = etAe:
Note that the sum of elements of matrix (55) is equal to:
Sum
0BB@
a b ::: b
b a :::
::: ::: b





Furthermore, by Miller (1981),
(H +G) 1 = G 1   1
1+tr(HG 1)G
 1HG 1; (57)
where G and H have the same dimension, G+H is nonsingular and rk(H) =
1.
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Appendix B: proof of proposition 1.
Proof of equation (15).









1 1 +  2

;













Proof of equation (18). Let us index player is neighbours by j 2
f1; ::::; di   1g. Consider the second period of communication. Recall equa-






x+ "1 + 
2 (p1   pi)
...
x+ "di 1 + 











1          1








where (1) is di   1 by di   1 matrix with elements
((1))ml =

1 +  2 +  42 (1  2) if m = l;
1 +  42 (1  ) if m 6= l; (59)
where m = 1; :::; di   1 and l = 1; :::; di   1.
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By equations (52) and (53),


























+  2 +  42 (1  2) if m = l;
2
1+2
+  42 (1  ) if m 6= l; (61)
where m = 1; :::; di   1 and l = 1; :::; di   1. Equation (18) follows from
equations (15) and (52).
Note that we can also nd conditional varianceVi

x j si; fx+ "j + pj   pigj2Ninfig

.
Indeed, by equations (53), (60) and (61),
Vi























By equations (13) and (63),
Vi






Proof of lemma 1. Lemma 1 follows from equations (15), (18) and
denition (3).
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Proof of equation (19).
Let us index is closed neighbours with j 2





















1          1
... 1 +  2 1    1









1 +  2 1    1
1 1 +  2 1
...
...






 2 + di   1  1     1
 1  2 + di   1  1
...
...
 1  1     2 + di   1
1CCCA :
(66)
By equations (65), (66) and (52),
Ei












By equations (65), (66) and (53),
Vi







Proof of equations (22)-(24). Recall that the vector of priors p is
distributed according to distribution (9). Let us order the playerspriors so
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that the subvector priors
pjN i = (pi; p1; :::; pdi 1)
comes the last. Let us denote the variance-covariance matrix of vector pjN i
by jN i (this is di by di matrix with elements 1 on the main diagonal and 











 1     1













Let pjgnN ibe the vector of priors by all players outside N i. Equation (22)
follows from equations (9), (69) and (52). Equations (23) and (24) follow
from equations (9), (69) and (53).
The elements of variance-covariance matrix  in equation (28).
Recall that we index open neighbours by player i with j 2

di + 1; :::; di
	
.
It is convenient to introduce notation w for the variance given by equation
(23) and  for the covariance given by equation (24). We furthermore denote
conditional variance (68) by v and conditional expectation (67) by . Let us
also introduce notation

































("k + (pk   p)  2) 
(ddi 1)
ddini














where:  is given by equation (20), v is given by equation (21),
(11)ml =

v +  2 +  4w if m = l;









if m = l;





if m 6= l;















dmni   1  2(dm   1)
i
;















di + 1; :::; di
	
, m 6= l. (71)
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Proof of equations (28) and (29). Equation (28) and set of equations
(29) and follow from equation (70), when ! 0 (and therefore, w ! 2 and
 ! 0) and d(m\l)ni = 0.
Proof of equation (31). Recall indexation (71). By set of equations
(29),
 = H + zG;
where
H = vI1T ;
Gm;l =
8>><>>:





if m = l > di +

di;
0; if m 6= l
and z is given by equation (30). Note that
rk(H) = 1:









































dlni if m 6 di +






dmni if l 6 di +










By equations (57) and (72)-(75),





By construction (standard properties of conditional independence) and equa-
tions (53) and (76),
Vi(x j si, fmj(t) j j 2 Ni; t = 1; 2g) =









Proposition 1 follows from equation (31).
Appendix C: proof of proposition 2.
In this appendix we mark explicitly that all the variables introduced by set
of notations 1 in Section 2 depend on the network.
1. Consider network composed of fm. It can be built up as follows: 2n
peripheral players from the large petal and the central hub h interconnect:
they form a circle and each player connects to the next n players on his right.
At the same time, 2n  1 peripheral players from a small petal form a circle
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and each of them connects to the central hub and n  1 peripheral player on
his right. As a result,
dh (fm) + d
0
h (fm) =M ; dh (fm) =M . (77)
By equation (31), set of equations (77) and the denition of M , the hub
receives the highest possible payo¤. Hence, there is no protable deviation
for the hub. Consider a peripheral player i:
di (fm) + d
0
i (fm) =M ; (78)
di (fm) = 2n if i is in the large petal; di (fm) = 2n  1 otherwise. (79)
By denition ofM , i cannot deviate by bridging two components. Therefore,
i can deviate in one of the following two ways:
(i) Link to a peripheral player in a di¤erent petal instead of linking to a
player in his petal. Denote the component resulting from such a deviation by
g1. By this deviation, i would keep the same total number of neighbours:
di (g1) + d
0
i (g1) =M , (80)
and he would lose all closed neighbours but himself (he would lose 2n   2
closed neighbours if he is from a small petal and 2n  1 closed neighbours if
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he is from the large petal), so
di (g1) < di (fm) . (81)
By equations (31), (78), (80) and inequality (81), the deviation is strictly
unprotable:
li (g1) > li (fm) .
(ii) Link to a peripheral player in a di¤erent petal instead of linking to the
hub. Denote the component resulting from such a deviation by g2. Thereby,
i would not alter the size of his distance-1 neighbourhood, remaining: 2n, if
i comes from a small petal; 2n + 1, if i comes from the large petal. At the
same time, i would decrease the size of his distance-2 neighborhood if m > 1
and keep it the same otherwise:
di (g2) + d
0
i (g2) 6M . (82)
Furthermore, i would lose all closed neighbours but himself:
di (g1) < di (fm) . (83)
By equations (31) and (78) and inequalities (82) and (83), the deviation is
unprotable:
li (g2) > li (fm) .
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2. Note that the argument in point 1 holds as long as links connecting
di¤erent components are ruled out by the upper limitation on a components
size, that is, as long as doubling the number of players in fk results in a
number above M :
2 jfkj = 2 (2n+ 1 + (2n  1)k) > M = 2n+ 1 + (2n  1)m,
which is equivalent to inequality (32).
3. Consider network composed of fk such that inequality (32) is false. By
denition of fk,
dh (fk) + d
0
h (fk) = dh (fk) = jfkj ; (84)
di (fk) + d
0
i (fk) = jfkj ; (85)
and di (fk) is given by set of equations (79), where h refers to the hub and i
to a peripheral player.
3.1. By equations (31) and (84), hub h has no protable deviations which
involve replacing one link with the other within fk. He could deviate by link-
ing to player j in a di¤erent component instead of linking with a peripheral
player from the large petal in his own component. Denote the component
formed by such a deviation by g3. The deviation allows h to increase the
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total number of his neighbours by at least 2n (if h connects to a player in a
small petal from the di¤erent component) and by at most jfkj (if h connects
to the hub from the di¤erent component):
dh (fk) + d
0
h (fk) + 2n 6 dh (g3) + d0h (g3) 6 dh (fk) + d0h (fk) + jfkj . (86)
However, h loses 2n closed neighbours:
dh (g3) = dh (fk)  2n. (87)
By equations (31) and (87) and set of equations (84), the deviation is un-
protable, that is,
lh (g3) > lh (fk)
i¤ inequality (33) is met.
3.2. Consider a peripheral player i from the large petal of fk. His most
protable deviation consists of linking to the hub from a di¤erent component
instead of linking to another peripheral player in his petal. Let us denote the
resulting component with g4. By deviating i doubles the total number of
neighbours:
di (g4) + d
0
i (g4) = di (fk) + d
0
i (fk) + jfkj = 2 jfkj . (88)
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However, he loses all closed neighbours but himself:
di (g4) = di (fk)  (2n  1) = 1. (89)
By equations (31), (88) and (89), the deviation is unprotable, that is,
li (g4) > li (fk)
i¤ inequality (34) is met.
3.3. Finally, consider a peripheral player i from a small petal (note that
a small petal exist i¤ k > 0). Proceeding as in point 3.2, we nd that a
peripheral player i has no protable deviation i¤ inequality (35) is met.
3.4. It remains to note that conditions (33) to (35) are increasingly strong.
Appendix D: proof of proposition 3.
1. Let us prove that if g 2 Gn( [ fm), then the network composed of g is
not robust. Suppose, by contradiction, that such a network is robust. By
denition (37) of set , there exist i 2 g such that
di 6 2n. (90)










for any j in f0. (92)
By equations (91) and (92), li(g) > lj(f0) for any j in f0, so g is not robust.
1.2. Suppose that
di 6 2n  1. (93)
By denition of M ,
di + d
0











with strict inequality if one of inequalities (90), (93) or (94) is strict. Hence,
g may be robust only if all inequalities (90), (93) or (94) hold as equalities.
1.3. Let us prove (by construction) that if all inequalities (90), (93) or
(94) are met as strict equalities, that is,
di = 2n; di = 2n  1 and di + d0i =M , (96)
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for any i in g such that di 6 2n, then g = fm.
1.3.1. For any i in g which neighbourhood is described by set of equations
(96), if there exist j 2 N i, such that Nj  Ni, then
dj < di = 2n  1 and dj < di = 2n. (97)
By denition of M , inequality (94) holds when i is replaced for j:
dj + d
0
j 6M . (98)




Therefore, g is not robust.
1.3.2. By step 1.3.1, for any i in g which neighbourhood is described by set
of equations (96), Nj = Ni for any j 2 N i. Consider some player i in g which
neighbourhood is described by set of equations (96). We can visualize i and
his closed neighbours as a petal. By the rst two equations in set of equations
(96), player i and his closed neighbours have one open neighbour, say, h. By
the latter equation in set (96), player h is connected with all other players
in component g. Consider M   2n players in component gnNi. If there exist
player i1 in set gnNi, such that di1 6 2n, then, set of equations (96) holds
65
when i is replaced for i1 and Nj = Ni1 for all j 2 N i1 (this is the situation
we are analyzing in this step, complementary situations where considered in
steps 1.1 and 1.2). By the last equation in set (96), player h is the unique
open neighbour by player i1 and all his closed neighbours. We can visualize
i1 and his closed neighbours as the second petal connected to the rst petal
through h. Applying this argument repetitively, we end up in the situation
where the players not organized in petals yet all have degree higher than 2n
(that is, at least 2n + 1) and they are all connected to h. Let us denote
the set of these remaining players by R. Note that by construction, none of
the players in set R receives links from the players organized in the above
petals. Therefore, relatively high degree by each of them is achieved through
their own linking capacity plus possibly that of the central hub. Players in
set R and hub together can build n (jRj+ 1) links, increasing its own sum
of degrees by 2n (jRj+ 1).35 The hub receives jRj links. The average degree








35 jRj denotes the cardinality of- (the number of players in) set R.
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Recall that it shall lie above 2n+ 1, which implies
jRj 6 2n. (100)
However, by the above construction of small petals, the latter equation in
set (96) implying that jgj =M and equation (1),
jRj > 2n+ (2n  1)k, (101)
where 0 6 k 6 m  1. By equations (100) and (101), jRj = 2n. This means
that the hub h and 2n in set R are interconnected, forming the large petal.
2. By step 1, any robust network belongs to set  [ ffmg. Consider a
wheel network g in set n ff0g. For any i in g,
di = 1; di + d0i 6 jgj 6M .
By equation (31),
li(g) > zz+jgj+22 for any i in g. (102)
By inequality (102) and equation (95),
li(g) > max
k2fm
lk(fm) for any i in g.
Hence, g is not robust (it is dominated in Rawlsian sense by fm).
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3. By equations (92) and (95),
max
i2fm
li(fm) > lj(f0) for any j in f0





li(fm) < lj(f0) for any j in f0





li(fm) < lj(f0) for any j in f0
i¤  22 = M 2n 1
2
. By equation (1), this is equivalent to the statement of
proposition 3.
Appendix E: proof of remark 2.
By proposition 2, network fm is a Nash equilibrium unconditionally. Network
f0 is a Nash equilibrium i¤  22 lies weakly above threshold 2n+12n , which







2n+ 1 < (2n  1)n, (103)
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because m > 1. The inequality (103) is equivalent to inequality
1 < (2n  3)n,
which is true because n > 2.
Appendix F: proof of proposition 4.
In this appendix we mark explicitly that all the variables introduced by set
of notations 1 in Section 2 depend on the network.
1. Consider network composed of efk. Players in efk can build
n
 efk = n (k (2n  1) + 1) (104)
links. At the same time, component efk has only nk (2n  1) links (n links
less). Hence, there is at least one player j with unused connection capacity.
Suppose that inequality (41) holds. Then, player j can deviate and link to
the hub of a di¤erent component. Denote the resulting network by eg1. By
deviating, player j doubles the total number of his neighbours:
dj (eg1) + d0j (eg1) = dj  efk+ d0j  efk+  efk . (105)
without altering the number of closed neighbours:
dj (eg1) = dj  efk . (106)
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By equations (31), (105) and (106) the deviation is protable.
2. Suppose now that inequality (41) does not hold. Then, only deviations
within the same component are possible. By equation (31), the hub cannot
gain by deviation, because all the players in his component are his closed
neighbours:
dh
 efk+ d0h  efk = dh  efk =  efk . (107)
A peripheral player i can deviate in two ways:
2.1. The rst possible deviation by i is to cut the link with a player in
his petal and link to the player in a di¤erent petal. Denote the resulting
network with eg2. While the deviation does not alter the total number of is
neighbours:
di (eg2) + d0i (eg2) = di  efk+ d0i  efk , (108)
it eliminates all is closed neighbours but himself:
di (eg2) = di  efk  (2n  2) = 1. (109)
By equations (31), (108) and (109), the deviation is strictly unprotable:
li (eg2) > li  efk .
2.2. The second possible deviation by i is to cut the link with the hub
and link to the player in a di¤erent petal. Denote the resulting network with
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eg3. By this deviation, i decreases total number of neighbours weakly, if k = 1
and strictly otherwise:
di (eg3) + d0i (eg3) 6 di  efk+ d0i  efk , (110)
and, at the same time, losses all closed neighbours but himself:
di (eg3) = di  efk  (2n  2) = 1. (111)
By equation (31) and inequalities (110) and (111), the deviation is strictly
unprotable:
li (eg3) > li  efk .
Appendix G: proof of proposition 5.
The proof of proposition 3 goes through with ower fm being replaced for
symmetric ower efm up to the sentence following equation (100) in step
3.1.2. As if then, the argument continues as follows. By construction of
small petal(s), the latter equation in set (96) implying that jgj = M and
equation r = 0,
jRj > (2n  1)k, (112)
where 0 6 k 6 m  1. However, if k = 1, then di 6 2n for any i in set R. If
k > 2, then, by equation (100), the average degree of a player in set is below
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2n+1. The remaining possibility is k = 0 which means that g coincides with
efm. The following steps go through until the last sentence which has to be
modied as follows. By equation r = 0, this is equivalent to the statement
of proposition 5.
Appendix H: proof of proposition 6.
In this appendix we mark explicitly that all the variables introduced by set
of notations 1 in Section 2 depend on the network. Consider network 's;K
from set s;K .
1. Network 's;K may be build as follows: peripheral players from the
same petal locate in a circle, and each of them connects to the hub and n 1











for any i in 's;K .
2. Suppose rst that inequality (44) is true. Then, cross-component
deviations are impossible. Therefore,
di (g) + d
0
i (g) 6 K. (114)
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for any i in 's;K and any network g formed by unilateral deviation by player
i from strategy prole in step 1. Furthermore,





for any i in 's;K and any network g formed by unilateral deviation by player
i from strategy prole in step 1. By proposition 1, equation (113) and in-
equalities (114) and (115), there is no protable deviation from the prole of
strategies in step 1 for no player.
3. No matter the prole of strategies through which network 's;K was
built, at least one peripheric player from petal of size s has unused connection
capacity or he duplicates a link already built. Indeed, it takes s(s 1)
2
links to
interconnect s, and s links to connect all these players with the hub. This is
less than connection capacity by s players:
s(s 1)
2
+ s < sn
is equivalent to true inequality s < 2n  1.
4. Suppose now that inequality (44) is false. By step 3, a peripheric player
from petal of size s has a protable deviation from any strategy prole leading
to network 's;K . The most protable deviation consists of connecting to the
hub from the di¤erent component.
73
Appendix I: proof of proposition 7.



















Furthermore, by equations (39) and (42),













By inequality (117) and r 6 2n  2,
s   r > 0. (118)
2. Necessary condition for robustness. We shall prove that if g is
robust it belongs to set s;M [ ffmg [ ff0g. Consider a robust network g
di¤erent from either fm or f0. Suppose that g robust.
2.1. First of all, note that
jgj > (2n  1) (m+ 1) + 2: (119)
Indeed, any network with component g weakly smaller than (2n   1)(m +
1)+ 2, where m is given by equation (39) is dominated in Rawlsian sense by
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f0 if inequality (38) is true and by fm otherwise (see the proof of proposition
3).
2.2. Robustness of g implies
di > s for any i 2 g. (120)
Indeed, if there is player i in g such that di < s, then, by true inequality
di + d
0
i 6M and equation (31) g is dominated by any network in set s;M .
2.3. Let us classify the players in g into three groups. First, the play-




i 2 g j di > 2n and dj > 2n for any j 2 N i
	
. (121)
Second, the players with at least 2n closed neighbours such that at least of
one of their closed neighbours has less than 2n closed neighbours:
B(g) =

i 2 g j di > 2n and dj 6 2n  1 for at least one j 2 N i
	
. (122)
Third, the set of players with closed degree less than 2n:
U(g) =

i 2 g j di 6 2n  1
	
. (123)
36A stands for autonomous players, B stands for benecieries and U stands for
underdog.
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2.4. Let us show that for any i in set U , N i = N j for any j in set N i.
Note rst that j 2 N i implies N j  N i. Suppose, by contradiction, that
N j  N i, that is, there exist player k 2 N inN j.
2.4.1. If N j \Nk = ?, then
di > dk + dj. (124)
By supposition (120), di > 2swhich, by inequality (43), contradicts i 2 U .
2.4.2. Suppose that there exist player b in N j \Nk. Player b being in N j
implies that any neighbour of b is linked with j. Player b being in Nk implies
that b is linked with k. Therefore, k is linked with j:
gkj = 1. (125)
However, recall that k was supposed to be outside N j. Therefore, k is js
open neighbour, that is, k has neighbour bk who is not connected with j:
gbkj = 0. (126)
By equation (126),
gwj = 0 for any w in Nbk. (127)
By supposition (120),
dbk > s and dj > s. (128)
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At the same time, k 2 N i implies gbkj = 1, and thereby
gwi = 1 for any w in Nbk. (129)
By set of equalities (127) and (129) and inequalities (128),
di > dbk + dj > 2s
which, by inequality (43), contradicts i 2 U .
2.5. Let us show that for any i in set U , dist(i; j) 6 2 for any j in
is component g. Suppose, by contradiction, that there exist player j in is








i 6M   r = 1 + (2n  1) (m+ 1) = jfmj   1:
By denition of set U , di 6 2n  1. By equation (31), the loss by player i is
higher than than by any player in fm. Hence, g is not robust (a contradic-
tion).
2.6. By inequality (119), denition of set U and the fact that g is con-
nected, each player in U has an open neighbour. By step 2.5, there exist
player h who is a common open neighbour for all players in U .
77
2.7. Now consider player i in A with the smallest closed degree. All his
closed neighbours have the same closed degree (no higher than i, hence, the
same). Therefore, i and his closed neighbours are interconnected and they












links. Therefore, the following in-












By denition of set A, di > 2n. Therefore, the left hand side of the above













Component g is connected, and the size of g is above di (if jgj = di then
g = f0 and so jgj = 2n + 1 which contradicts inequality (119)). Therefore,
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The set of inequalities implies that inequality (130) can be met only as strict
equality when













Note that players in Ni use all their connection capacity.
2.8. For any i in A, is open neighbour is the central hub by players in U :

di = h . If not, i with all his closed neighbours is on distance at least 3 from
at least some player j in U , so the total number of js neighbours is below
M   2n, the number of js closed neighbours is at most 2n  1, by equation
(31), js loss is higher than that by the least happy player in fm.
2.9. The remaining players are in set B. If jBj = 1, then B = fhg, and
so g is in set s;jgj. Let us show that if jBj > 1, then g is not robust.
2.9.1. Consider eh 2 Bn fhg. Note that eh is linked with h. The reason is
that by denition of set B, eh has at least one closed neighbour i in set U .
By step 2.6, i is connected with h, so must be eh. This insight combined with
steps 2.6, 2.7 implies
di + d
0
i = jgj for any player i in g.
By equation (31), the set of the least happy players consists is equal to the set
of players with the smallest closed degree. Note that the least happy players
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must be in set U .
2.9.2. By denition of set B, eh has at least one neighbour j not connected
with i or is neighbours (if not, then eh 2 N i and so di > deh > 2n: a
contradiction).
2.9.3. Suppose rst that eh is connected with one of the least happy players.
Let us cut all links by h but those with that least happy player and his
neighbours. As a result, that least happy player and its closed neighbours
get happier without hurting any other least happy player. Hence, g is not
strictly robust.
2.9.4. Suppose that none of the least happy players is connected with eh.




Let us replace ehs links with all players in U by the links with l and its
closed neighbours. The resulting network reduces the loss by l and its closed
neighbours without hurting any other least happy player. Once again, g is
not strictly robust.
2.10. By the above steps, any strictly robust network g di¤erent from f0
and fm is in set s;jgj. Suppose jgj < M , as described by equation (46). Then,
80
s < s (see the main text).
By steps 2.1. to 2.10, if g is strictly robust it is in set s;M [ffmg[ff0g.
3. Characterization of strictly robust networks. We shall now
characterize robust networks in set s;M [ ffmg [ ff0g.
3.1. If g is in s;M , compare to fm: fewer players r   1 less but 2n   1
closed neighbours instead of s; and also to f0: 2n+ 1 closed neighbours.
3.2.1. Recall f0 versus fm (38)
3.2.2. Compare f0 versus g. f0 outperforms g i¤
 22(2n+ 1) + 2n+ 1 >  22s +M
 22 > (2n 1)m+r 1
2n+1 s . (131)
3.2.3. Let us now compare performance of fm versus g. fm outperforms
g i¤
 22(2n  1) + 2n+ 1 + (2n  1)m >  22s +M
 22 > r 1
2n 1 s . (132)








2 (r   1) < (2n  1)m (2n  1  s) . (134)





i¤ inequality (134) is true.
If m > 2 then inequality (134) is true: by inequality s < 2n   1 the
right-hand-side of inequality (134) is at least as high as 2(2n   1) while, by
inequality r 6 2n  2, the left-hand side of inequality (134) is no higher than
2(2n   3). Furthermore, if m = 1 and r < 2n+1
2
, inequality (134) is true as
well. However, if m = 1 and r > 2n+1
2
, inequality (134) is inverse and so is
inequality (133).
Hence, if m > 2 or m = 1 and r < 2n+1
2
, threshold (132) is the smallest
while threshold (38) is the highest. Therefore, f0 is the unique robust network
i¤ inequality (38) is true. If  22 is equal to the right-hand side of inequality
(38), there are two robust networks: fm and f0. If inequality (38) is strictly
inverse while inequality (132) is true, the unique robust network is fm. When
 22 is equal to the right-hand side of inequality (132), the set of robust
networks is s;M [ ffmg. Finally, if inequality (132) is strictly inverse, the
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set of robust networks is s;M .
If m = 1 and r > 2n+1
2
, threshold (38) is the smallest while threshold
(132) is the highest. Therefore, f0 is the unique robust network if inequality
(131) is true. If inequality (131) is false, the set of robust networks is s;M .
At the threshold (131), the set of robust networks is s;M [ ff0g.
A Appendix J: proof of proposition 8.














2 < 0: (136)
2. By set of equations (135), the hub has no protable deviation i¤ the
hub does not want to save sum (48) and loose a link with one of the peripheral
players, that is, i¤







This condition is met as an equality.
3. By step 1, peripheral player i has no protable deviation if set of the
following three conditions is met.
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3.1. Peripheral player i does not want to save c
2
sacricing a link with










3.2. Peripheral player i does not want to save c   tih sacricing the link












3.3. Peripheral player i cannot increase its total nulber of neighbours. He
does not want to establish 2n  1 links with players from a di¤erent petal so
as to double the number of his closed neighbours i¤







3.4. The set of inequalities (137) to (140) is equivalent to c belonging
to interval (51). Note that the right-hand side of inequality (140) lies below
that of inequality (138), which in its turn lies below that of inequality (139).
Therefore, the right-hand side of inequality (140) divided over 2n   1 lies
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below the least of the double of the right-hand side of inequality (138) and
the sum of the right hand side of inequalities (139) and (137). That is,
interval (51) is full.






< 2 2 < (2n 1)m
2
, (141)
there is no strong Nash equilibrium. The reason is that by inequality 2 2 <
(2n 1)m
2
, f0 is not a strong Nash equilibrium. Consider fm. By inequality,
(2n 1)m
2
 n+2 < 2 2, two players from one small petal plus all players from
one other small petal can interconnect, keep 2n   3 neighbours on distance
2 and gain:
2 2(2n+ 1) + 2n  3 > 2 2(2n  1) + jfmj





Appendix L: Robust network with long com-
munication.
Suppose that
M = n+ 1 = k, where k 2 IN; k > n:
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Figure 11: wheel network with M = 11 players (n = 2).
Consider network formed as follows. The players locate in a circle, each
player builds links with n players on his right. The resulting network is a
wheel. Figure 11 illustrates the wheel network with M = 11 players each




(at least ve periods in our example in Figure 11). Straightforward extension
of Lemma 1 shows that each player in a wheel network learns the signals and
priors by all players in his component. To illustrate the argument, each player
in the wheel in Figure 11 receives 4 messages from his neighbours in each
communication period. This amounts to 20 messages in ve communication
periods. From these messages, player i can deduce 20 unknowns: the priors
and the signals by other players in his component. Hence, the wheel network
is robust.
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